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A B S T R A C T   
This manuscript presents tools and data that serve to enable an evaluation of the risk associated with vertical fire 
spread on buildings. A highly detailed context to cladding fires is described to unveil the complexity and 
magnitude of the problem and to identify gaps of information. An engineering framework is then developed 
which delivers required information that fills some of those gaps and that needs to be used towards achieving 
quantified fire performance. The data itself has been published as a publicly available database, entitled the 
Cladding Materials Library (www.claddingmaterialslibrary.com.au). This data can be used to support building 
fire risk assessments or as the basis for more in-depth research into façade fires. This paper presents the context of 
the data together with the competency framework necessary for upskilling building professionals to have the 
capacity to implement the engineering framework.   
1. Introduction 
The manner in which high-rise building construction has evolved in 
the last two decades has resulted in the number of very large-scale 
building fires increasing in a dramatic way. Notable among these fires 
is the Shanghai fire with 58 victims and the Grenfell Tower fire with 72 
victims. These fires have been documented extensively and in the ma-
jority of the cases the fast spread and ultimate magnitude of the fire is 
related to the manner in which the façade system was designed. Despite 
the numerous failures, it remains unclear how to address these complex 
systems to deliver a quantitative performance assessment that enables 
fire safety engineers to establish, in an explicit manner, an adequate fire 
safety strategy. 
The façade system is an integral component of the fire safety strategy 
because the ultimate effectiveness of the strategy is strongly under-
pinned by the need to contain the fire to a single floor. Or, in some cases, 
even to a single unit. The performance and robustness of the fire safety 
strategy is defined by multiple layers of protection that include: detec-
tion and alarm, suppression (e.g., sprinkler) systems, smoke 
management, compartmentation, egress strategy (stay-put, phased, or 
simultaneous (‘all-out’)), firefighting, and structural stability. For a 
building which has a stay-put evacuation strategy, the detection and 
alarm system are often isolated to single units, and cannot alert occu-
pants to fire spread away from the compart of origin. Sprinklers, if 
included, act as a supplementary means to reduce the probability of fire 
growth but cannot be relied upon as a sole means of protection. Sprin-
klers, as well as smoke extraction and stair pressurisation systems, will 
become overwhelmed once multiple floors are affected by fire. Vertical 
fire spread represents a failure in compartmentation, and switching to 
an ‘all-out’ evacuation strategy becomes necessary but may not be safe 
due to the spread of fire and smoke throughout the building. Finally, the 
structure will be exposed to a long duration, full building fire for which 
it is not designed and which threatens the life of remaining occupants 
and firefighters in the building. This is described in more detail by To-
rero [1]. 
The spread of fire from one floor to another compromises the entire 
fire safety strategy, and the layers of protection or robustness are not 
adequate to protect the occupants or the building. Therefore, 
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establishing the capacity of a façade system to prevent external fire 
spread and quantification of the potential fire spread rates becomes an 
unavoidable calculation for the development of a holistic fire safety 
strategy. 
The fire safety strategy defines what is adequate for a specific 
building [1], and in the case of a ‘stay-put’ strategy, adequate means no 
vertical fire spread. In contrast, some vertical fire spread may be 
permissible in cases where a fire safety strategy is driven by detection 
and alarm and where the evacuation strategy is prescribed as phased or 
‘all-out’. The maximum acceptable fire spread velocities need to be 
quantified and contrasted with predicted egress times. Thus, the vari-
ables that control vertical fire spread need to be distilled and assessed 
either through fire dynamics principles or testing. This has proven to be 
an extremely complex task in the case of modern façade systems. 
Reducing the risk of fires migrating beyond the floor of origin is thus 
critical to protecting life safety and reducing potential for property 
damage. Research conducted in the last five decades has delivered 
different approaches that were deemed appropriate until the advent of 
novel façade systems. The most common strategies to achieve this are 
the use of a combination of non-combustible materials to ensure that the 
external envelope does not promote spread, and the design of balconies, 
spandrels or flame deflectors to prevent flames spreading from one 
storey to another. Ashton & Malhotra [2] showed for their set of ex-
periments that a minimum of 0.91 m spandrel or 0.61 m horizontal 
projection would be required to prevent smoke and flames from re- 
entering the building. Specific dimensions have later been quantified 
based on the compartment characteristics of the storey below. Yokoi [3] 
calculated the required spandrel height or horizontal projection width 
based on the fuel load, compartment dimensions, opening size, and 
corresponding flame height. Glazing was assumed to fail at 500 ◦C, and 
so this was used as the threshold temperature for spread. The protection 
offered by horizontal projections has been shown to be superior to 
spandrels for the same dimensions [4]. Subsequent research has 
included ‘realistic fuel’ in the form of furniture and a range of internal 
ventilation conditions (e.g. a draught from an open door) which found 
larger flame lengths and would require larger spandrels [5,6] than 
previously predicted and that the incident heat flux to the façade is 
underestimated for a non-uniform fuel load [7,8]. In addition to this, any 
penetrations or opening have to be designed appropriately and firestops 
must be implemented to prevent the spread of fire. Despite the crudeness 
and conservative nature of many of these measures, these strategies 
were effective in preventing breach of vertical compartmentation. 
The desire for the reduction of energy consumption became an 
important driver in design, resulting in the introduction of building 
envelopes as a practical means to reduce energy consumption. For 
example, the stringent targets for improving sustainability and energy 
efficiency for buildings in the EU [9] accelerated the already rapid 
changes in façade systems. Other drivers such as ease of construction, 
cost, aesthetics and acoustics have also emerged [10], and the contin-
uous building envelope has become the preferred solution for retrofit 
and new builds [11–13]. 
The continuous building envelope brings an inherent problem in that 
it is susceptible to deformations that are very different to the structure to 
which it is attached. This creates the potential to render firestop ar-
rangements ineffective, and allow penetration of the fire from a lower 
compartment to one above. This problem is further exacerbated by the 
use of specific materials, such as aluminium, to respond to other drivers 
such as weight reduction and ease of manufacturing. Aluminium loses 
all mechanical integrity by 550 ◦C [14] and melts at 650 ◦C, which are 
well below the temperatures of typical fires e.g., up to 1000 ◦C for 
external flames [15]. Thus, these materials represent no barrier to a fire. 
The lack of quantifiable performance has also manifested itself in 
situations where the outcome of major external fires has not been as 
tragic. In these cases, the level of robustness was sufficient and the fire 
either did not spread, or if it did spread life safety was still ensured. In 
the Lacrosse fire (Melbourne, 2014), the cladding ignited due to a 
balcony fire and spread rapidly upwards thus breaching vertical 
compartmentation [16]. The building contained an interconnected 
alarm system, two fire-isolated staircases that were pressurised and kept 
clear of smoke, a cascading (or sequential) evacuation strategy, and 
sprinklers installed in each apartment. These levels of robustness were 
sufficient to allow all occupants to evacuate with no fatalities and no 
serious injuries. There was nonetheless an unacceptable level of damage 
and led to insurance claim of 5.7 m AUD (€3.6 million) being awarded to 
the owner [17]. This was paid by the fire engineer (39%), building 
surveyor (33%), architect (25%), and the individual deemed responsible 
(3%, but paid by the builder). Similarly, the Address Downtown fire 
(Dubai, 2015) was a 63-storey building where the fire breached 
compartmentation and spread upwards externally. The layers of pro-
tection were capable of maintaining life safety with only 16 injuries and 
no fatalities but the property damage was again unacceptable and led to 
an insurance claim of 1.22 billion AED (€309 million) being awarded 
[18]. These are two of many examples where similar outcomes were 
observed but where the façade systems were very similar, the fire spread 
rates were very different and so were the life safety outcomes [1,19,20]. 
In summary, compartmentation provided by façade systems is crit-
ical to the fire safety strategy. The capacity of façade systems to 
constrain and slow the spread of a fire needs to be quantified to establish 
the adequacy of the fire safety strategy. Extrinsic drivers have resulted in 
façade systems of unknown fire performance and unpredictable fire 
safety outcomes. Therefore, it is essential to revisit the fundamental 
processes determining how a façade system supports the desired level of 
fire safety performance and, as a result, deliver tools that enable engi-
neers to quantify such performance. 
1.1. Current approaches to compliance and suitability 
Compliance with building regulations has been the main approach 
used for performance assessment of novel façade systems and has 
generally been defined by combustibility requirements. These combus-
tibility requirements have become the drivers behind product and sys-
tem development. 
Building regulations have maintained strict rules regarding the 
combustibility of any material used on the external surface of a building. 
In England and Wales, guidance in the now superseded version of 
Approved Document B [21] specified that external wall surfaces above 
18 m should be European class B or better, and that insulation and other 
fillers should be of ‘limited combustibility’. The European classification 
framework EN 13501-1 [22] involves a series of tests where the Single 
Burning Item test EN 13823 [23] is required to achieve a ‘B’ classifica-
tion. No plastic material can adequately fulfil those requirements unless 
it is encapsulated in a non-combustible material. The strategy of 
encapsulation thus became a driving force for the use of combustible 
materials within the building envelope. Aluminium Composite Panels 
(ACPs) or aluminium foil covered cellular plastic insulation are perfect 
examples of systems where encapsulated combustibles materials are 
used. These systems spread widely because of their reduced cost and 
because they provided an effective solution to many of the required 
building functionalities. 
The combination of an encapsulated combustible product added to a 
continuous, lightweight building envelope results in systems of enor-
mous complexity and innumerable components. Many of these compo-
nents have been fixed in manners that favour ease of construction [24] 
but do not necessarily take into consideration their performance in fire 
[25]. 
As a consequence, existing combustibility tests can no longer be used 
in their standardised form for these encapsulated products in a way that 
gives meaningful data. This is because they are designed to assess in-
dividual materials rather than composite products. Furthermore, the 
desired performance still needs to be established in the context of what is 
acceptable from the perspective of vertical fire spread. 
First principle fire dynamics are therefore needed to describe vertical 
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fire spread. This can be done for simple configurations and over 
combustible materials [26] but even under these simplified conditions 
there is still much uncertainty on how to quantify spread rates. Complex 
systems that rely on encapsulation cannot be described by any of our 
current tools, and while several studies have attempted to do this after 
Grenfell [27–30] none of them has produced a well validated and suf-
ficiently robust set of predictions. Furthermore, these studies have been 
calibrated against standard tests with very limited instrumentation that 
do not provide the necessary precision to address the accuracy of com-
plex formulations. Finally, none of the current testing practices used to 
define performance of these complex systems are capable of establishing 
the mechanisms by which encapsulation fails, do not explicitly provide 
rates of fire spread [31,32] nor enable the estimation of any of the pa-
rameters that might control fire spread. These testing practices will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
1.2. Existing testing 
Testing individual components according to combustibility tests will 
yield basic material information describing whether there are organic 
components which can oxidise and release energy but give little other 
indication of performance. The EN 13501-1 framework [22] specifies 
the ISO 1716 heat of combustion test [33] and ISO 1182 non- 
combustibility test [34] to assess ‘non-combustibility’ or ‘limited 
combustibility’. The gross heat of combustion for a sample is determined 
and the material is deemed to be non-combustible if it is below a certain 
value. The non-combustibility test consists of inserting a sample into an 
insulated 750 ◦C furnace and recording the temperature. If the tem-
perature rises above a set threshold then the material will be deemed to 
have failed, and is deemed combustible. The criteria for ‘limited 
combustibility’ – which is to pass either of the above specified tests – 
does not however provide the means to assess vertical fire spread. This is 
because there are a number of complicated interrelated phenomena to 
evaluate which are not captured through a simple value of the gross heat 
of combustion. 
‘System’ or ‘scenario’ tests have been proposed as an alternative that 
might provide an estimate of the ensemble consequences of all the 
detailed and complicated interrelated phenomena controlling fire 
spread. Nevertheless, it is unclear if any of these scenario tests are 
suitable for this purpose. One alternative has been the use of existing 
standard tests e.g., Single Burning Item (SBI) EN 13823 [23] as part of 
the EN 13501-1 framework mentioned previously. The SBI test method 
has been shown not to be effective for encapsulated products, where the 
failure modes are related to the deformation of the metal skin rather 
than the ignition and burning of the underlying core material [35]. The 
intent of these tests is to give a generalised assessment of the combus-
tibility and flaming behaviour of materials, and they are not designed for 
adequately assessing mechanical deformations. The burner imposes a 
relatively low incident heat flux with a peak of 30–35 kW m−2 [36] and, 
for many arrangements, it is not sufficient to induce this failure mode. 
Since the heat exposure is insufficient to create thermal deformation, the 
core material remains well sealed and no pyrolysis gases can escape and 
lead to ignition. Furthermore, oxygen diffusion to the core material is 
inhibited and so combustion in the core is limited. A metal skin encap-
sulation acts as a thermal barrier that has a high thermal inertia which 
reduces the rate of temperature increase and in turn increases the time 
taken to reach the ignition temperature of the core material. The barrier 
is defined with sufficient thickness to prevent ignition or failure of the 
material in the limited duration of the test. Foil-faced materials are 
protected through a combination of high reflectance reducing the 
absorbed heat flux, and also sealing of the core flammable material 
thereby preventing escape of the pyrolysis gases and reducing oxygen 
ingress to the core material. Encapsulation of products to protect 
combustible materials from ignition sources cannot be evaluated by 
means of these tests because the aim is no longer material performance 
assessment but system performance assessment. These competing 
objectives lead to confusion and ultimately do not deliver the necessary 
information to predict fire spread. 
An alternative to provide evidence of performance for these systems 
is to develop performance assessment strategies specifically designed for 
the purpose of establishing the potential for vertical fire spread. Again, 
the first and simplest is establishing performance by means of a ‘scenario 
test’ e.g., BS8414 [37] or NFPA 285 [38]. There are a large number of 
these test methods around the world, with different jurisdictions having 
a number of modifications around a common theme. The different test 
methods, scales, heat sources, detailing (e.g., windows and fixings) and 
thresholds for passing for each test method has been summarised in the 
literature [39,40]. Furthermore, these scenario tests have been used as a 
route to compliance. For example, in England and Wales the supporting 
document BR135 [31] stipulates pass/fail limits for tests run according 
to BS8414 leading to the potential interpretation that meeting the 
passing criterion is a sufficient route to compliance. Nevertheless, this 
criterion is based on a limited number of temperature measurements, 
and failure criteria specified at a height above the combustion chamber. 
There is no measurement or assessment of fire spread rates. 
Part of the shortcoming of the quantitative criteria – i.e. that the 
temperature increase must not exceed 600 ◦C for 30 s within the first 15 
min, among others – is that there is no justification for their basis and 
this information is not useful for a designer to assess the risk of fire 
spread. Even ignoring the limits set by BR135, the sparseness of 
instrumentation in BS8414 makes it impossible to assess flame spread. 
Thermocouples are provided at only two levels: 2.5 m and 5.0 m above 
the combustion chamber. With only two points, it is not possible to 
assess whether the flame spread is accelerating or decelerating, and thus 
whether it will achieve burnout or whether it may spread up the 
building. Furthermore, the rigid preselection of the heights may not be 
relevant to other specific buildings where the openings and storeys may 
not align to these heights. This also means that the cavity barriers are not 
located at representative heights for a real building as they are instead 
located at heights suited to achieving the best performance in the test. 
Even the rationale behind the definition of the fire scenario has been 
questioned [41] with alternative configurations proposed as being more 
consistent with the thermal exposures of fully developed fires. A parallel 
plate configuration is proposed to significantly increase the imposed 
heat flux to the façade, in the order of 110 kW m−2 and decaying over 
height (compared to 45–95 kW m−2 in BS 8414). While delivering 
improved repeatability, the intent of the tests is to predict pass/fail in 
the larger 25 and 50 ft (7.6 and 15 m) room corner tests. This is based on 
the level of acceptable risk and corresponds to empirical limits deter-
mined by Nam & Bill [42]. These tests still lack any of the fixing details, 
do not include complicated window details, and remain heavily reliant 
on every single system being tested. Thermomechanical failure is also 
not evaluated as the comparatively thin panels (i.e. two panels of 550 
mm width) are well fixed using rivets thereby preventing any significant 
deflections. 
Despite this, there is only a single pre-defined prescribed scenario 
which is deemed to be representative of an external fire. Prescribing the 
fire load prevents a designer from creating a performance solution 
tailored to a specific building. The scenario itself assumes that the key 
risk is from a fire spreading upwards, with some limited lateral spread. 
In flame spread, concurrent (upward) flow propagates at velocities more 
rapid than opposed (downward or lateral). Some lateral spread was 
present throughout Grenfell Tower but especially significant at the 
architectural crown of the building due to the geometry and configu-
ration of materials [43]. Analysis by Torero [1] shows that flaming 
droplets from the crown induced downward flame spread and acceler-
ated the lateral spread across and around the building. This led to faster 
downward and lateral spread rates, and a larger maximum affected area. 
This behaviour is uncommon but also present in some other building 
fires, and Torero [1] provides comparison with the crown fire in the 
Monte Carlo Hotel & Casino (USA, 2008). Lateral and downward spread 
was also observed in Tamweel Tower (Dubai, 2012) and Grozny Towers 
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(Russia, 2013) [19]. These examples show that flaming droplets or 
downward spread are key risks potentially leading to large fires. How-
ever, it is not quantitatively assessed in the tests and there are no failure 
criteria associated with these risks. 
The systems tested in ‘scenario tests’ include multiple interconnected 
components and the relative performance or contribution of each 
component cannot be evaluated with sparse measurements or observa-
tions. The difficulty in characterising even a single one of these com-
ponents was evident from the standardised combustibility frameworks 
described earlier. The lack of quantified data and lack of understanding 
of the fire behaviour during a test means that the data can only be 
extrapolated to conditions very close to the exact conditions and 
configuration in which it was tested, and therefore does not represent an 
adequate assessment of performance. The tests also lack repeatability 
and reproducibility due to their large scale as investigated by Anderson 
et al. [44] and also as evident in the lack of repeatability of the exposure 
in tests performed by Holland et al. [45]. Furthermore, the systems are 
often constructed under idealised conditions in a testing laboratory, and 
are simplified versions of façade systems as used in real buildings. The 
expert witness reports of Lane and Bisby [25,43] describe the vast 
complexity of the façade system installed in Grenfell Tower compared to 
the heavily simplified versions in scenario tests. 
A critical parameter is the time taken for vertical compartmentation 
to be breached, however, the complexity of these tests and the sensitivity 
on specific configurations means that this is not possible to ascertain. 
Furthermore, the configurations do not represent a complete system and 
so the results are not directly applicable to buildings as they fail to 
represent a real building fire scenario. 
Additionally, this testing should not be used simply as a certificate of 
compliance but should be used as evidence to support an engineering 
analysis performed by a competent individual [1,31]. This has been 
shown not to have been the case in practice. This ultimately leads to the 
generation of information which may not represent a relevant fire sce-
nario nor provide the quantified data required to assess the potential for 
fire spread. This is a case of a test that is problematic for two reasons, 
first because it does not provide any information related to the perfor-
mance needs and second because its arbitrary definition makes it 
impossible to conduct in a repeatable or representative manner. 
To add to the complexity, the exact composition and performance of 
different materials varies despite many times being labelled as the same 
product. This has added further difficulty to the process of assessment. 
This means that there must be some form of testing to verify the 
composition of a material, or otherwise it must be assumed to be the 
worst possible case. 
1.3. Desktop studies 
An alternative to ‘scenario tests’ is through simply using analysis i.e. 
desktop studies. In this case, a qualified engineer extrapolates existing 
testing data to write a report as proof of performance. One step further 
would be extrapolation or determination of performance without any 
test data, possibly with the aid of computer models. This has led to 
systems being accepted through analysis alone with inadequate support 
testing evidence. 
The result was the widespread use of these systems until specific 
failures detonated extensive investigations that questioned the use of 
these methods. The two particularly relevant cases are the Lacrosse 
Building and Grenfell Tower fires which both had fires with different, 
but unacceptable, consequences. The investigations collated detailed 
information of the fire scenario, materials used and their configurations, 
building design, design and approval process, etc. not available in other 
past building fires. These investigations highlighted both that flammable 
systems were in wide use, and that the measures of protection were not 
adequate. 
A multiplicity of complex failure modes have been observed 
including: failure of encapsulation, melting and dripping of burning 
plastic material, deformation and fall-off of burning components, pref-
erential spread through cavities and the associated failure of cavity 
barriers, breaches of barriers due to deformations, fire enhancement by 
means of heat feedback from multiple burning components, etc. None of 
these failure modes were anticipated by any of the existing performance 
assessment practices thereby casting enormous doubt on the capacity of 
‘desktop studies’ to deliver a robust performance assessment. 
2. Initial response 
The immediate reaction to these events resulted in numerous actions 
led by governments and institutions such as the fire brigades. The 
Lacrosse and Grenfell Tower initial fire investigations focused on the 
assessment of combustibility concluding that all plastic materials in 
these façade systems failed to meet the requirements of non- or limited- 
combustibility. The UK Government commissioned testing to rapidly 
identify whether non-combustible materials were present in the building 
façade. The heat of combustion was determined using ISO 1716 [33] and 
limits were set to determine the combustibility, as shown in Table 1. This 
formed the screening method, and only ACP samples were accepted. 
Two-thirds of samples were rejected (1503/2235) as out of scope by the 
end of the screening process [46] because they did not meet the required 
criteria. 
The Insurance Council of Australia developed a similar approach 
intended to have broadly equivalent categories to the BRE method, and 
were labelled A to D. This was based on the material composition, and 
used polymer content to classify materials. Additional alterations have 
also been developed to help address the hazard posed by other flam-
mable materials contained in a façade, such as insulation. At present, 
these materials are recorded but not ranked. They include expanded 
polystyrene (EPS), polystyrene/phenolic composites, polyurethane 
(PUR) and polyisocyanurate (PIR). 
The method however has shortcomings. There is no evidence to 
support a 30% organic content cut-off (Categories B to D) as leading to 
no flame spread. The objective of the testing is confused because it is 
only adequate to identify whether a material is combustible or not (i.e. 
> 0% polymer content), and therefore is incapable of determining fire 
spread performance. The testing is not capable of delivering information 
of the fire performance of a material nor of a product or a complete 
system. It also fails to capture any of the failure mechanisms described 
previously, such as failure of encapsulation or melting, which would be 
relevant for assessing external fire spread. 
There are also difficulties in accurate determination and quantifi-
cation of chemical composition, and has misplaced confidence on the 
precision. Commonly applied chemical analytical techniques are not 
able to measure organic content directly, and usually infer it based on 
inorganic characterisation. There are biases in the techniques used to 
perform the analysis and the results have significant error margins, as 
with any measurement technique. This confusion leads to acceptance of 
materials with 29% polymer content but rejection at 31%. The error 
margins incurred when using this information to assess the potential for 
external fire spread will be significantly larger. This is evident from the 
fire spread rates collected from a limited number of real building fires by 
Torero [1]. Ultimately, this method gives no assessment of the fire 
performance even for ACP materials, and cannot be applied for any non- 
ACP materials. 
Subsequent studies using the scenario tests reinforced the perception 
Table 1 
Classification of ACP samples according to the protocol commissioned 
by the UK government and developed by the BRE [47].  
Classification Criteria 
Category 1 ≤3 MJ kg−1 
Category 2 >3 MJ kg−1 and ≤ 35 MJ kg−1 
Category 3 >35 MJ kg−1  
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of inadequacy associated to materials such as those in the Lacrosse 
building or Grenfell Tower. The UK Government commissioned a series 
of tests [48] containing ACPs from each of the categories (Table 1) and 
two types of insulation – stone wool (SW) and PIR – to be performed 
according to BS 8414 [37] and classified to BR135 [31]. The results 
confirmed inadequate performance with both tests containing the 
Category 3 ACP (Tests 1 and 2) and the one test with Category 2 and PIR 
(Test 3) all being classed as having a ‘fail’ outcome according to the 
limits set in BR135. A further seventh test was later performed on a 
Category 2 ACP and phenolic foam which was also classed as a ‘fail’. 
These tests feature systems which are both simplified and idealised in 
a way that makes them unrepresentative of systems installed in build-
ings. These tests were performed as a result of the Grenfell Tower fire, 
and so the tests should be representative. The closest configuration is 
Test 1 containing category 3 (pure polyethylene) ACP and PIR insu-
lation. From the details given – the calorific value of the ACP and the 
density of the PIR – it is not possible to identify the exact materials. The 
synthetic rubber weatherproofing membrane is not present in any of the 
tests, nor are a plethora of other materials including uPVC (unplasticised 
polyvinyl chloride), timber, XPS (extruded polystyrene), and additional 
combustible insulation in thin cavities. This also highlights the 
complexity of the actual systems containing highly convoluted ar-
rangements and geometries. These configurations, in addition to 
imperfect installation, lead to the presence of thin cavities between 
panels and other detailing. These details could potentially elongate 
flame lengths because of the reduced air entrainment and can help 
facilitate flame spread. Lane’s expert witness report [25] highlights that 
the there are multiple continuous thin cavities in the building details 
which provide pathways for fire to spread unimpeded. These are so 
numerous and complex that they cannot comprehensively be included in 
these tests, and are bespoke to individual buildings. 
In the UK Government scenario tests, the ACP fixing method was 
riveted to create a flush straight finish, and the gap between panels was 
set at 20 mm. This is fundamentally different from the cassette system 
installed at Grenfell. The fixing details are different, and furthermore the 
‘return’ detail where a length of ACP is folded at the end of panels is not 
included. To create folds also requires removing a portion of the 
aluminium skin which exposes an unprotected length of the core. The 
gap between panels is nominally the same, 20 mm, but the return detail 
forms a thin channel with ACP on either side. This geometry restricts air 
entrainment, causing elongated flame heights and potentially enhancing 
flame spread rates. The available data test from EN 13823 appears to 
qualitatively support this, as a riveted system achieves Euroclass B or C, 
which is superior to the Euroclass E of a cassette system as found by 
Lane’s investigation of documentation on Grenfell Tower [25]. Never-
theless, none of these studies provide a comprehensive characterisation 
of the parameters affecting fire spread. 
Lane’s analysis further shows that the Grenfell cassette system does 
not match the standard cassette system detailing provided by the 
manufacturer [25]. This means that even when the same type of fixing 
method is used, the details on buildings still vary in an unknown and 
unpredictable manner. Thus, the riveted system as used in Test 1 is not 
representative of a system as installed on a real building, and does not 
necessarily represent a worst case scenario to be able to adequately 
assess the risk of external fire spread. The same logic applies to the other 
six tests and to other fixing methods. 
Furthermore, in Grenfell the exposure of the ACP core of the cassette 
system immediately above the openings is hypothesised to have been a 
key factor in external fire spread [49]. This was unprotected, and no 
cavity barrier was provided immediately above the window meaning 
that the core would be immediately exposed to flames from a 
compartment fire. In the tests, there was instead a 5 mm thick 
aluminium profile at the top of the combustion chamber which seals and 
protects the cavity from the spread of smoke and flames. Additionally, 
an intumescent cavity barrier with a stated integrity/insulation (ac-
cording to EN13501-2 [50]) of 90/30 min was added above this. The 
tests only have a set duration, and this detail must fail for the fire to be 
able to enter the cavity, or otherwise the ACP cladding must first 
degrade or deform for a gap to open. The limits set in BR135 relate to the 
first 15 min of exposure, and so this detail is highly beneficial in 
providing sufficient protection to delay failure beyond this time period. 
None of the tests failed these classification criteria, and instead Tests 1, 
2, 3 and 7 failed on a separate criterion that a test must not spread flame 
above the height of the rig, as assessed by visual observation. This 
further suggests that the limits set in BR135 are not effective, and rely on 
a subjective qualitative measure for success or failure. 
The UK Government data is limited only to the specific individual 
materials used in the tests and does not include other materials of sys-
tems that could pose a risk. For example, high pressure laminates (HPL) 
are a distinct type of material which cannot be extrapolated from the 
above test results. The potential hazard of this material is evident from 
the Lakanal House fire (UK, 2009) with a type of HPL that led to the 
death of six people [51]. A further BS8414 test was therefore commis-
sioned by the UK Government to assess a system with this material [52], 
although it is not officially included as part of the seven tests described 
above. This system contained “A1 insulation” – likely to be mineral wool 
based on the Euroclass and the photographs provided – and successfully 
passed the limits set in BR135. Despite this, there was a sudden tem-
perature rise in the test from 400 ◦C up to 700–950 ◦C at the upper 
height (level 2, 5.0 m above the combustion chamber) which suggests 
that there was ignition and sustained burning. This occurred over a 
period from 25 min and 35 min, which represents burning both before 
and after the crib was extinguished at 30 min. This ignition late into the 
test further suggests that the system may have been close to failing on 
the “flaming above rig” criterion, where Tests 1, 2, 3 and 7 all failed. The 
test was performed at a separate facility from the other seven tests, and 
repeatability and reproducibility of the testing has already been shown 
to be poor. Thus, despite achieving the performance criteria in BR135 it 
would be difficult for a designer to use this data to confidently assess the 
risk of external fire spread as the crib is extinguished at a key point in the 
flame spread process. 
This test represents a single data point in non-ACP materials and only 
a single type of HPL. In cladding samples taken from UK buildings, these 
non-ACP systems represented up to 67% and the above tests do not allow 
characterisation of the potential fire risk. Recognising this issue, the UK 
Government commissioned testing of additional non-ACP materials 
[53]. Testing on 28 samples – including zinc and copper composite 
panels, HPLs, and stone and brickslip products – was performed in an ad 
hoc reduced-scale rig with a wood crib fuel source broadly representa-
tive of BS8414 in terms of the imposed incident heat flux (45–75 kW 
m−2) and duration of burning (30 min). The heat exposure was intended 
to be sufficiently severe to induce failure mechanisms not possible using 
SBI. However, the tests incorporate composite products and introduce 
an air gap (50 mm), fixings, and joints. These attributes add extra 
complexity that are not trivial to characterise yet do not constitute full 
system behaviour. 
Of these attributes, the vertical joint location represents a key 
weakness in a system. It provides a channel to promote vertical flame 
spread, and thermal expansion leads to exposure of the core in a shorter 
time as it is not protected by encapsulation or a coating. Despite this, its 
location changes from directly behind the fuel source in the worst case 
but in other cases is up to 0.5 m away. The impact of this is demonstrated 
in the testing of HPLs with different European classifications. Those with 
the same or superior Euroclass (C–D) and a joint directly behind the crib 
took 4–5 min for the fire to enter the cavity, while those with worse 
Euroclass (D) and a distance of 0.5 m to the joint took 11–17 min. This 
shorter time to enter the cavity then led to higher temperatures recorded 
at the top of the rig (324–366 ◦C compared to 267–282 ◦C) suggesting 
more likely fire spread. This was nonetheless not evaluated systemati-
cally and ultimately means that the different materials and groups of 
materials cannot be adequately compared as the conditions are funda-
mentally different. The complexity of these systems is such that it cannot 
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easily be extrapolated to other configurations without serious difficulty 
despite the fact that it is shown to impact the results. 
The parameters evaluated above also highlight the difficulty in 
extracting useable quantitative information from these tests. The 
instrumentation is denser than in large-scale tests but interrelated phe-
nomena progress simultaneously. The tests are concurrently attempting 
to evaluate the ability of the material to act as a barrier, the potential for 
fire spread on the exterior of cladding, the intensity of a cavity fire, and 
the potential failure as a result of a cavity fire. The composite nature of 
the ACP adds complexity in the heat transfer mechanisms, melting 
behaviour, thermomechanical deformation and possible delamination. 
Additional difficulty is that one event depends on another. For example, 
the cavity fire will be dependent on the time taken for the cladding 
barrier to fail and for the flames to penetrate through. If penetration 
times are long, then an active cavity fire cannot be evaluated effectively 
because the test will terminate partway through the process due to the 
arbitrary time limits. 
The reports compare the available parameters to a series of ‘cali-
bration’ tests involving three types of ACP each tested with two trials, 
for a total of six tests. The vertical joint location is not kept consistent 
between the different types of materials, with 0.5 m for ACP A2, 
0.25–0.5 m for ACP FR, and 0 m for ACP PE. The different vertical joint 
location in the two ACP FR tests led to ignition of the cavity near the end 
of one test but not the other, which again illustrates the influence of 
vertical joint location. These tests are therefore not well suited to be 
calibration tests. Furthermore, there is no experiment for an inert wall or 
product and instead modelling is relied upon to provide a baseline. The 
reports use these calibration tests to conclude that no other material 
represents the same level of hazard as pure PE core ACPs. However, they 
otherwise make little to no definitive conclusions on the relative per-
formance of other materials, whether they would constitute acceptable 
performance, and under what other conditions there could be acceptable 
performance. This therefore does not provide designers with the infor-
mation that they need to evaluate non-ACP products or product systems. 
The combination of the lack of repeatability, simultaneous evalua-
tion of multiple interrelated phenomena, lack of a complete system, 
sensitivity on the configuration, comparison to highly flammable ma-
terials and the lack of satisfactory data, all make it impossible to 
adequately use this information to assess the hazard of any materials or 
systems from the results of these tests. It is also important to repeat that 
exact material composition can alter the outcome and in none of these 
cases was this fully characterised. 
2.1. Outcome and implemented methods 
Despite the weaknesses of the information available, what followed 
these assessments was the immediate removal of façade systems in many 
countries and widespread review of the existing systems with the 
objective of identifying systems that represented an unacceptable level 
of risk. As an example, in the audit of non-conforming building products 
in Queensland (Australia) there were almost 15 000 buildings registered 
for investigation and 76% were found to not have flammable cladding 
with no further assessment needed [54]. In Victoria, further along the 
audit process, they identified 72 buildings with extreme risk and 409 
with high risk as of July 2019 [55], and in the UK, 455 high-rise resi-
dential or publicly-owned buildings are affected [56]. 
The costs associated with remediation of large numbers of buildings 
are substantial. To deal with the crisis, Victoria (Australia) has set aside 
$600 million AUD (€360 million) [57], and the total cost has been 
estimated [58] as $250 million to $1.6 billion AUD (€150 million to 
€950 million). In England (UK), a fund of £600 million (€690 million) 
was announced for high-rise residential buildings with high risk ACP 
systems [59], and a further £1 billion (€1.15 billion) for non-ACP sys-
tems [59]. The National Housing Federation (NHF) in the UK have 
estimated that the total cost of remediation may be more than £10 
billion (€11.5 billion) [60]. These estimates are very similar for other 
countries. 
The methodologies used for assessment have been proven not to be 
robust and have left many gaps and contradictions. Buildings such as the 
Neo 200 building (Melbourne, Australia) were deemed of low or mod-
erate risk but nevertheless have sustained large fires. Despite this, the 
same methods are still being used. 
Furthermore, instead of developing new and more appropriate 
methods of assessment, attempts are still being made to iterate around 
the existing methods suggesting that they can be further simplified. 
Studies have attempted to demonstrate that the scenario tests can be 
scaled down and still provide adequate results [61]. The fire exposure is 
also scaled down, imposing 40 kW m−2 [62] to the façade which is only 
slightly higher than the peak exposure in SBI [36] described earlier. As 
with the BS8414 tests commissioned by the UK Government, the system 
was highly simplified and does not capture critical aspects leading to 
failure of the system. None of the measurements – including the addition 
of a calorimeter to measure heat release rate – allow separation of the 
various materials or component contributions. Assumptions are instead 
based on the difference in measurements from the nine different systems 
tested. The tests are not able to discriminate between any of the non-ACP 
PE systems in any meaningful way. Nonetheless, these scaled down tests 
are still being provided as evidence to demonstrate that combustible 
insulation has very limited impact of fire spread [61]. 
In contrast, other researchers have established that these conclusions 
are inadequate and the methods are not appropriate [63]. They cite that 
the constructions tested do not match real buildings in terms of the 
location of cavity barriers and height of storeys, the lack of window and 
other penetration details, that pass/fail criteria are not appropriate for 
the wide range of building types, and that all data should be publicly 
available. They propose that a new method needs to be developed based 
on quantified scientific means with improved repeatability and repro-
ducibility. Scenario tests intend to provide a representation of reality but 
require enormous characterisation to allow extrapolation [25]. Thus, 
most tests are conducted with systems that are idealised and are by no 
means a representation of the systems implemented in buildings and 
therefore do not represent reality. Lane [25] details 15 discrepancies 
between Grenfell Tower and the BS8414 report provided by the insu-
lation manufacturer. This not only highlights the level of characterisa-
tion required, but also that these discrepancies arise due to the idealised 
nature of the tests which ultimately makes them neither representative 
nor useful. 
Finally, a decision making tool – NFPA EFFECT [64] – has been 
developed that uses expert opinion to enable performance assessment 
and decision making in matters pertaining to fire safety of façade sys-
tems. Users are able to input details of a building and will receive a 
corresponding risk rating. However, there is no evidence given to sup-
port the rating, and there is no way to understand the basis for how the 
rating is generated. For example, a different rating will be given 
depending on whether the wall cavity size is greater than or <75 mm. 
This is an arbitrary limit based on the expert judgement of the panel of 
developers, and cannot be interrogated in any way. The tool has been 
rarely used to aid decision making and authorities have shown no in-
terest in adopting it. The lack of uptake of such a tool represents clear 
evidence of the current lack of confidence in expert opinion. 
3. The current situation 
The conclusion of all the work conducted post-Grenfell demonstrated 
that the existing tools and testing practices are inadequate for the 
assessment of the performance of modern façade systems. None of the 
existing tools can reproduce the different phenomena observed, in 
particular the strongly coupled thermomechanical behaviour that re-
sults in deformations, rupture, and complex interactions between 
combustible and non-combustible materials. Existing standard testing 
methodologies have proven incapable of delivering adequate, relevant 
or sufficient information for performance assessment of systems, and 
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‘scenario’ tests are not only too complex, lack adequate instrumentation 
and are too sensitive to construction detailing but more fundamentally 
cannot recreate the desired conditions or deliver the necessary infor-
mation for design. 
The overall outcome of the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire has 
reinforced the already existing perception that there is an intrinsic 
problem in the manner in which the construction industry is addressing 
fire safety [65,66] and the need for a new path. The Warren Centre re-
ports [67] and the Grenfell Phase One report [68] have introduced 
competency as a new aspect of the problem. The complexity of these 
systems is such that none of the stakeholders have the necessary skills to 
address their fire safety. Furthermore, presumptions of competency have 
been proven flawed with accreditation and certification systems 
rendered completely inadequate. This was highlighted in Phase One of 
the Grenfell Inquiry which was focused on the cause and spread of the 
fire, and the response of the London Fire Brigade. The Phase One report 
[68] concluded that, despite the well-recognised scenario, firefighters 
were not able to establish the risk through inspection, could not quantify 
the hazard during the events, and were not able to implement a response 
strategy that was effective at fulfilling their obligations to reduce the loss 
of life. 
The complete lack of confidence in our capacity to assess perfor-
mance has resulted in complete bans on all combustible materials used 
in façade systems in numerous countries around the world. These bans 
have been accompanied by other extreme measures like the incorpora-
tion of sprinklers in all residential buildings above 11 m (UK) and the 
introduction of stringent management structures [69]. The cost associ-
ated to these measures is very significant, and has created unnecessary 
challenges for many industries, for example, the timber industry. 
The conclusion is that there is a need to generate the underpinning 
knowledge necessary to properly assess the performance of these sys-
tems. The previous sections have reviewed the past and current efforts to 
understand the problem to emphasise the shortcomings of the current 
approaches but mainly to determine the appropriate fire safety objec-
tives as well as to extract the information needed to be able to demon-
strate – in a quantitative manner – that those objectives have been 
attained. 
The framework proposed thus focuses on two physical phenomena 
deemed of relevance to the fire safety strategy, (a) the characterisation 
of the no-fire spread condition and (b) the quantification of fire spread 
rates. Therefore, for the framework to be able to address the integrity of 
the performance assessment process, it needs to include the following 
components:  
(i) Characterisation of all combustible materials for identification 
purposes  
(ii) Characterisation of all materials to quantitatively determine all 
properties associated to their combustibility  
(iii) Characterisation of material performance by implementation of 
bespoke testing and adequate diagnostics  
(iv) Integration of material performance within a framework that 
enables characterisation of product system performance  
(v) Implementation of calculation methodologies that can enable the 
incorporation of the product system performance into the 
assessment of the overall performance of the fire safety strategy  
(vi) Definition and implementation of a competency framework that 
delivers the certified professionals that have the necessary com-
petencies to conduct an overall performance assessment of the 
fire safety strategy for buildings with complex building 
envelopes. 
4. Engineering framework 
A robust engineering framework has been developed by The Uni-
versity of Queensland in partnership with the Queensland Government 
to provide the means to evaluate the potential for external fire spread. 
This includes the components (i)–(v) described immediately above, to 
identify materials on buildings, characterise them in a meaningful way 
to help address building performance, and underpinned by the required 
competence (vi). The backbone of this framework is a publicly available 
flammability database, the Cladding Materials Library (https://cla 
ddingmaterialslibrary.com.au [70]), which contains the underpinning 
knowledge required to assess façade system performance. All of the test 
methods used are commonly available to ensure that others are easily 
able to implement the framework, without the need for highly specialist 
equipment. This also ensures that existing tools and models can be 
readily applied. 
This paper does not explicitly review the theory associated to the no- 
fire spread or the calculation of fire spread rates. There is a vast body of 
literature that describes the different parameters required and, given the 
many differences between systems or buildings, it will be pointless to 
create a calculation framework. This is why, instead, this paper in-
troduces a competency framework that should deliver competent pro-
fessionals capable of using the existing literature and the parameters 
quantified here for the purposes of a proper risk assessment. 
The framework for the library contains two testing protocols. A series 
of experimental methodologies termed the detailed testing protocol is 
used determine the complete material properties, thermal properties, 
and fire performance for a given cladding material. This includes 
chemical composition; thermal degradation; gross heat of combustion; 
critical heat flux for flaming ignition; ignition temperature; total heat 
transfer coefficient at ignition; apparent thermal inertia; time to ignition 
and residual mass as a function of incident heat flux; heat release rate 
and mass as a function of time and incident heat flux; effective heat of 
combustion; and critical heat flux for flame spread and flame spread 
parameter for both horizontal and vertical orientations. The database 
currently contains 27 materials and new materials can be added at any 
time, ensuring that it is futureproof. This number of materials has 
already been shown to be effective for fire risk assessment in Queens-
land, and contains materials relevant to other regions and climates. Data 
is essential in the development, verification and validation of more 
advanced models currently unavailable to fire engineers, and funda-
mental towards understanding the interactions of different materials in a 
system. This database delivers components (ii) and (iii) summarised at 
the end of the previous section, in a way that they can be incorporated as 
part of calculations for a system and building described in components 
(iv) and (v). This protocol requires samples in the region of 1 × 1 m2 and 
consists of:  
(a) Chemical composition quantification  
(b) Thermal decomposition of a material  
(c) Gross heat of combustion  
(d) Ignitability measurements  
(e) Burning behaviour  
(f) Flame spread characteristics 
It would be prohibitively expensive for building owners to run 
detailed flammability testing for all materials on all buildings. Instead, 
the framework features a screening testing protocol where materials 
on a building are identified with samples of dimensions 10–100 mm. 
There are only a finite number of cladding materials possible, and this 
obtains a unique fingerprint for each material. This is then used to cross- 
reference the database, and find whether the same material already 
exists. If it does, then the flammability data from the database can be 
used directly without having to run expensive and time-consuming 
flammability testing. If not, then the testing can be performed, or 
other decisions can be taken to decide on how to characterise the fire 
risk. Alternatively, the decision may be made to simply remove the 
cladding, at substantial cost. This delivers component (i) detailed in the 
previous section. This protocol requires samples of approximately 
10–100 mm diameter and consists of: 
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A. Chemical composition quantification  
B. Thermal decomposition of a material 
The competency framework is delivered through the development 
of two Continuous Professional Development (CPD) courses. The first of 
these ensures that fire engineers have the skills and competency to able 
to design and assess buildings containing extremely complex flammable 
façade systems. A second course is also specified for other building 
professionals to ensure that they also understand key considerations in 
regards to external fire spread. This ensures that professionals with the 
necessary skills are delivered and can perform fire risk assessments 
competently. This delivers the final component (vi) detailed in the 
previous section. 
This whole process enables fire engineers to be able to confidently 
perform quantified fire risk assessments for buildings with flammable 
claddings. An abridged version of the framework is described in the 
following sections. In response to calls for increased transparency and 
the availability of test reports, all the data is publicly available free of 
charge, and a number of supporting guidance documents comprehen-
sively describe the background [71], testing methods [72], sensitivity 
[73] and use of the Library [74]. 
4.1. Tools & data – The cladding materials Library 
The process to use the Library is shown in Fig. 1 and is as follows: 
1. Remove a number of samples from the building as required. Guid-
ance for how many and their locations is available [75]. A sample 
from each unique material or panel should be taken, and more 
samples should be taken for taller buildings, larger cladding areas or 
high-risk buildings such as hospitals. 
2. Perform the screening testing protocol to obtain the unique finger-
print associated with a material to be able to cross-reference it with 
the database.  
3. A competent fire safety engineer should identify whether there is an 
identical material in the Cladding Materials Library [70]. If there is, 
then the flammability data from the Library can be used for that 
sample without the engineer having run their own tests to determine 
the flammability. Details on the required competencies for engineers 
are described in Section 4.2.1.  
4. If there is no identical material, then there are still options that 
remain: 
a. Perform a detailed testing protocol to obtain the needed flam-
mability data.  
b. Exercise best judgement to identify whether the data from another 
similar material can be used, erring on the side of caution and 
taking suitable responsibility for the decision [76]. The 
complexity of fire risk means that the same criteria cannot be used 
for every material, and the engineer will need to use their 
judgement and competence to make an appropriate assessment.  
5. Alternatively, identify the relevant fire scenario and conduct a large- 
scale fire test for that building-specific façade system, materials, 
Fig. 1. Process for using data from the Cladding Materials Library.  
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geometry, and detailing. It should be noted that this option is far 
more expensive and requires a huge amount of material to be 
removed from a building (e.g. approx. 25 m2 for BS 8414 [37]) and is 
only relevant for one specific scenario as tested.  
6. If none of these options are feasible, then the material represents an 
unknown risk and appropriate action must be taken. This may 
require the entirety of the cladding to be removed as soon as possible, 
and temporary mitigation measures to be in place until this is 
achieved.  
7. Repeat all the steps above for each sample on the building.  
8. Review and investigate the fire safety strategy of the building and 
write a quantified fire risk assessment specific to that building. This 
should take into consideration not only the materials but also the 
response of the overall façade system and the response of the 
building in the event of a cladding fire. 
This process addresses the initial investigation required for a build-
ing to assess the relative fire risk of its cladding material. Fire engineers 
can use this to answer the following questions and make decisions: 
• Does this building contain flammable cladding which will over-
whelm the fire safety strategy of the building?  
• Is remediation required? If so, in what form? Specification should 
include both long-term and interim measures.  
• Is more data required to be able to make a more complete 
assessment? 
4.1.1. Sample preparation 
In general, the intent of this framework is to extract fundamental 
material properties of the core. Every effort is then ensuring that the 
testing is able to extract representative and relevant properties. As such, 
materials containing encapsulation – e.g. metal skins on aluminium 
composite panels or steel facings on sandwich panels – had this removed 
so that the core material properties could be determined. Small-scale 
experimental methods are often not designed for composites or prod-
ucts with heterogeneous composition, as reviewed in detail previously in 
Section 1.2. As a result, using these test methods on materials for which 
they were not designed or intended gives little useful information, and 
do not aid a building assessment. Full sample preparation details are 
given in the guidance documents [72] with the express intent that other 
researchers and practitioners should be able to replicate the results 
without any issue. Sensitivity studies are also available [73]. 
4.1.2. Testing protocol components 
Both the screening and detailed testing protocols are comprised of a 
number of testing methods or objectives. These have been labelled Parts 
A to F. The testing conditions are summarised in Table 2 and brief de-
scriptions of the methodologies are given in the bullet points below. 
The parameters selected for use in the framework are quantifiable, 
repeatable and reproducible, and provide the means to evaluate mate-
rial performance. The extraction of these properties is known to be 
apparatus or environment dependent but this is still sufficient to assess 
the relative hazard of each material, especially given the huge variation 
in upward flame spread e.g. as shown in the data collated by Torero [1]. 
A review of material property flammability and their application to 
models is described by Bal [77] and scaling up is reviewed by Torero 
[78]. Key novelties added by the proposed framework are (a) a robust 
means of material identification, through the screening testing protocol, 
and (b) the addition of upward flame spread through modifying a 
commonly available apparatus. This enables engineers to estimate the 
relative hazard of each cladding material. 
This cross-referencing of the screening protocol to the library data is 
a critical novel component of the framework that enables building 
Table 2 
Summary of testing parameters and outputs for parts of the framework.  
Framework part Apparatus Samples and dimensions Testing conditions Outputs 
A1. Compound 
identification 
ATR-FTIR 1 sample 
15 × 5 × 0.5 mm3 
32 scans/locations 
3 locations 
4 cm−1 spectral resolution 
Material components (qualitative) 
A2. Elemental 
quantification 
EDXRF 1 sample 
40 mm diameter 
Vacuum, standardless method. Ranges: 20 kV − 50s 
; 40 kV − 50s ; 50 kV − 100s 
Elemental composition (quantitative) 
A (combined)    Chemical composition (quantitative) 
B. Thermal 
decomposition 
TGA/STA 2 samples 
10.3 ± 0.4 mg unless otherwise 
noted 
5.2 ± 0.3 mg for wool insulation or 
sarking 
2.5 ± 0.2 mg for foam insulation 
1.0 ± 0.1 mg for adhesives 
1 test in air; 1 test in N2 
50–800 ◦C 
20 ◦C min−1 
150 ml min−1 purge flow 
50 µl Al2O3 crucibles, no lid 
Mass as a function of temperature, m 
Derivative mass as a function of 
temperature, dm/dT 
C. Bomb calorimetry Bomb 
calorimeter 
3 samples  
<1.0 g 
Pure oxygen environment Gross heat of combustion, ΔHc 
D. Ignitability Mass loss 
calorimeter 
As many samples as needed 
100 × 100 mm2 
No ignition within 900s 
q̇cr’’ defined as value halfway ignition and no ignition 
Critical heat flux for flaming ignition, 
q̇cr’’ 
Ignition temperature, Tig 
Total heat transfer coefficient at 
ignition, hT 
E. Burning behaviour Cone calorimeter 6 samples total – 2 samples per 
incident heat flux, q̇inc’’ 
100 × 100 mm2 
q̇inc’’ = 35, 50, and 60 kW m−2 
(80 kW m−2 was also provided in some cases) 
Mesh grid in place (25 mm spacing) with retainer 
frame 
Apparent thermal inertia, kρc 
Effective heat of combustion, Δhc,eff 
Heat release as a function of time, q̇’’ 
Mass as a function of time, m 
Peak heat release rate, q̇p’’ 
Time to ignition, tig 
Mass residue, mfl 
Total heat released, Et 
F. Flame spread LIFT 4 samples (2 horizontal and 2 
vertical) 
600 × 100 mm2 
q̇inc’’ = q̇cr’’ + 5 kW m−2 
Preheating time until sample reached thermal 
equilibrium 
Critical heat flux for flame spread, q̇0,s’’ 
Flame spread parameter, Φ 
Flame velocity as a function of heat 
flux, Vs 
Inverse root flame velocity as a 
function of heat flux, Vs-1/2  
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owners and engineers to run a limited number of small tests but gain 
access to a fuller suite of flammability data. This provides the needed 
flammability data to assess the fire risk associated with upward flame 
spread. Thus, the chemical composition provided by the screening 
protocol in itself does not provide the means to perform a fire risk 
assessment. The chemical composition should only be used to reference 
the database, and then the flammability data should be used to evaluate 
the potential for external fire spread. There are some situations where 
this is not the case e.g., the identification of purely inorganic materials 
where no further testing is needed or useful. The building fire risk 
assessment should still consider other risks or possible modes of fire 
spread.  
• Chemical composition (Part A) – The chemical composition is an 
accurate determination of the constituent components of a sample 
and helps oversimplification into categories such as “ACP FR” (where 
FR is fire retardant) or “HPL”. A number of chemical analytical 
techniques can be combined to determine the composition and there 
is no correct way to obtain this data. For the framework develop-
ment, qualitative compound identification using ATR-FTIR (Atten-
uated Total Reflectance Fourier Transform Infrared spectroscopy) 
according to ASTM E1252 [79] was paired with quantitative 
elemental identification using EDXRF (Energy Dispersive X-Ray 
Fluorescence spectrometry) according to ASTM D6247 [80]. The 
combination of these two techniques enables the accurate identifi-
cation and quantification of the different components in a sample. 
This represents one half of the screening protocol. It should be 
strongly emphasised that the sole purpose is to identify materials to 
cross-reference with the library, and that the chemical composition 
alone is not an assessment of material flammability. This should also 
be remembered when considering the precision of error margins, and 
a ± 1 % change in the chemical composition will have no perceptible 
effect on vertical fire spread on a full building.  
• Thermal degradation (B) – Thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) or 
simultaneous thermogravimetric analysis (STA) according to ASTM 
E1131 [81] provides thermal decomposition of the material as a 
function of temperature. TGA could be used as a sole means of ma-
terial identification but the presence of overlapping reactions in 
complex materials results in difficulty of accurate identification of 
materials. This data is an additional step in the screening protocol to 
aid material identification, to improve robustness, and to prevent 
gaming the system. The lattermost was heavily criticised in con-
struction industry inquiries [65,66]. This also provides some quan-
tified data which can be used by a practicing engineer in an initial 
assessment, for example, an indication of a possible pyrolysis or 
ignition temperature based on analysis of the chemical reactions.  
• Bomb calorimetry (C) – The first component of the detailed testing 
protocol is the determination of the gross heat of combustion using a 
bomb calorimeter according to ISO 1716 [33]. This gives an upper- 
bound limit on the amount of energy that a material can release 
and can aid in the hazard assessment of the sample. However, it does 
not inform on the rate at which the heat is released, or on the ignition 
behaviour of a material.  
• Ignitability (D) – The critical heat flux can be determined using a 
mass loss calorimeter according to the process described in ISO 5660: 
Annex H [82] but without calorimetry. This measures the minimum 
amount of energy required to ignite a sample – the critical heat flux 
for flaming ignition – which enables calculation of the ignition 
temperature [72] according to the classic ignition theory for flaming 
solids [83] as well as the total heat transfer coefficient at ignition. 
The ignition temperature can then be used as a means to classify 
materials according to their ignitability. The risk of ignition is 
particularly relevant to vertical flame spread, as materials which 
ignite readily will also cause rapid flame spread. Furthermore, those 
with a low critical heat flux are more ignitable and thus may 
represent a greater hazard.  
• Burning behaviour (E) – The heat release rate and mass loss of a 
material are critical in evaluating its fire hazard and are some of the 
most commonly used metrics in fire safety engineering. Standardised 
data and metrics can be obtained according to ISO 5660 [82]. The 
use of three radiant heat fluxes for each material also allows deter-
mination of the apparent thermal inertia [83] which indicates how 
rapidly the temperature of a material rises when exposed to a heat 
source. This enables evaluation of the fire risk associated with 
cladding materials, and the scale is sufficient that the relative 
effectiveness of fire retardants and inorganic fillers will be evident. 
The burning rate is ultimately a critical parameter in vertical flame 
spread given the direct relationship between flame height and ma-
terial heat release rate [84].  
• Flame spread (F) – An empirical flame spread correlation can be 
obtained using a reduced-scale [85] LIFT (Lateral Ignition and 
Flamespread Test) apparatus designed in principle with the proced-
ures described in ASTM E1321 [86] and ISO 5658 [87]. A flame 
spread parameter is calculated which allows assessment of the rela-
tive flame spread performance of materials. To obtain the best re-
sults, the research methodology from the original literature [88–90] 
was adopted. As such, there were significant deviations from the 
standards referenced above [86,87] which are described in detail 
[72]. Testing was also performed in the vertical orientation to give 
an assessment of the potential for vertical flame spread. The condi-
tions in vertical orientation change and the flame length overlaps the 
pyrolysis region which rapidly increases the rate of pyrolysis up-
stream and thus leads to much larger flame spread velocities. Further 
analysis will be required in future to correctly utilise this data in a 
quantitative manner. Flame spread analysis requires input from the 
other preceding sections. The critical heat flux for flaming ignition is 
required in order to set the incident heat flux to the sample, as 
described above. The thermal inertia, ignition temperature, and total 
heat transfer coefficient at ignition are also required for the calcu-
lation of the flame spread parameter. 
4.1.3. Initial version of the library 
An initial version of the database has been published based on an 
audit of all publicly-owned buildings in Queensland, Australia. There 
were 1,095 samples taken from approximately 57 buildings or sites, and 
a total of approximately 9,221 tests were performed. The samples were 
taken from all external layers of the building fabric, including under-
lying insulation and weatherproof membranes. This technique also 
means that non-ACP outermost cladding layers were captured, such as 
wood-based materials or polycarbonate façades. The challenges from 
assessing external wall assemblies are not only limited to ACPs and are 
instead dictated by both material and system performance. 
A total of 88 unique different cladding materials were identified. 
From these, 20 representative materials were selected to perform the full 
detailed testing protocol and further determine their heat of combus-
tion, ignition behaviour, heat release, and flame spread characteristics. 
This number of materials was based on the available time and budget 
with the possibility of new materials to be added after the conclusion of 
the initial project. Materials were also selected to have relevance to 
other climates and construction methods across the world to ensure 
immediate applicability. Of the 1,095 samples screened, 584 samples 
had an exact corresponding detailed testing entry in the library. A 
further 278 samples corresponded to materials that do not require 
detailed flammability testing, for example, metallic sheets or largely 
inorganic mineral wools which do not ignite. In total, this means that 
79% of samples had exact corresponding entries from the initial library 
alone. 
The initial list of 20 materials was composed of:  
• 11 ACPs with varying performance including: 1 predominantly 
inorganic material, 2 with aluminium sheet geometries bonded by 
adhesive, 2 predominantly polyethylene-core, 2 with primarily Al- 
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based FR, 3 with primarily Mg-based FR, and 1 cellulose/phenolic 
composite; 
• 2 remaining cellulosic-based materials including: 1 phenolic/cellu-
lose composite with FR and 1 primarily cellulose-based material;  
• 6 insulation materials including: 2 PIR foams, 1 PHF (phenolic) foam, 
1 PUR foam, 1 EPS foam, and 1 polyester fibre insulation (PET);  
• 1 sarking (weatherproofing membrane) consisting of glass fibre 
reinforced polypropylene with Al backing. 
Stone wool and glass wool insulation were screened and had their 
heat of combustion determined as part of the detailed testing protocol. 
The materials did not ignite, and there was little value from further 
testing. 
An initial assessment of these materials and the trends in their 
behaviour has been performed [91]. ACPs with the same polymer con-
tent were shown not to have the same fire performance, as reflected by a 
75% increase in peak heat release rate for the same polymer content. 
This evidence directly contradicts the assumptions made in the existing 
frameworks described in Section 2 and similar assumptions regarding 
gross heat of combustion as an indicator of fire performance. Applica-
tion of a simple upward flame spread model combining ignitability and 
flammability [84] showed that aromatic materials, including HPLs, have 
a huge range of performance. Those with high phenol resin content were 
ranked as least likely to propagate spread, while those with higher wood 
fibre content would behave in-line with typical cellulose-based charring 
solids. The model illustrated the stark differences in behaviour between 
distinct insulations, and that sarking and thin film ACPs (i.e. samples 
where aluminium profiles are held together by <1.0 mm resin) can yield 
flame spread, which has not been assessed anywhere else. This forms the 
basis for additional in-depth analysis. Furthermore, detailed analysis is 
required to fully assess the fire risk of vertical fire spread for all these 
materials, especially as part of a system. 
Since the completion of the project, a further 7 materials have been 
tested through the private sector, comprising 3 further ACPs with pri-
marily Mg-based FR, 1 further PUR foam insulation, 1 WPC (wood 
polymer composite), 1 GFRP (glass fibre reinforced polymer composite), 
and 1 GFRP epoxy adhesive. There are a large number of Mg-based FR 
ACPs in the database as the FR is obtained through mining natural 
minerals and thus subject to large amounts of impurities and differences 
in composition [73]. The fire performance must then subsequently be 
characterised to enable adequate assessment of their fire risk. The main 
Al-based FR, aluminium hydroxide, can instead be commercially man-
ufactured through the Bayer process which consistently produces a 
purer material (99%) and has near insignificant variation in composition 
[73]. The addition of the new materials demonstrates that using fire 
performance as the metric is futureproof, and enables new or innovative 
materials to be included and can be assessed using the same framework 
without modification. 
4.2. Education and competency – CPD courses 
4.2.1. Fire safety engineering professionals 
The complexity of the engineering framework requires upskilling 
building professionals, and thus two CPD courses were developed to 
achieve this. The first is designed for practicing fire safety engineering 
professionals and aims to give them the skills and tools to tackle the 
cladding fire crisis. Participants must have an accredited engineering 
degree, be a fire safety engineering practitioner with demonstrated 
experience, or either be registered as a professional engineer or other-
wise capable of becoming one. The pathways for becoming a fire safety 
engineer have been defined [92] as:  
(i) Through formal education and achieving an accredited Fire 
Safety Engineering degree, later complemented by on the job 
experience under the guidance of a suitably qualified competent 
individual.  
(ii) Alternatively, exclusively through on the job experience working 
on projects to gain the skills and knowledge necessary, and again 
with appropriate mentorship and supervision. 
The extent of this modern problem and the frequency of recent 
events suggests that many engineers have not been adequately equip-
ped. The complexity of façade systems cannot be underestimated. As 
such, it is necessary to complement their existing skills or knowledge 
through additional training. This enables the engineers to be able to use 
the data output from the database outlined in the previous sections. A 
five-day full-time CPD was designed to help achieve this and runs 
annually. It consists of seven modules with the associated learning 
objectives:  
1. Analysis of the fire strategy of a building (4 h) – How to describe the 
fire safety strategy of a building with respect to external fire spread  
2. Fundamentals of vertical flame spread (7 h) – How to analyse the 
fundamental fluid mechanics, thermodynamics and fire science 
which drive upward flame spread  
3. Review of professionalism and the design process (2 h) – Taking 
responsibility and how to effectively implement fire safety systems as 
part of a prescriptive design  
4. Curtain wall systems and structural mechanics (1 h) – How to 
approach different building types and their relevance to external 
flame spread and how to analyse thermomechanical behaviour in 
common systems to assess potential for fire spread  
5. Cladding Materials Library and laboratory sessions (7 h) – How to 
use the Cladding Materials Library and correctly interpret the data 
6. Reformulation of the fire safety strategy (11 h) – How to create ho-
listic fire safety solutions which connect the fundamental fire 
behaviour, the complexity of façade systems, and the fire safety 
strategy  
7. Examination (3 h) 
It should be noted that the course simply contains robust knowledge 
which is readily accepted by the community. Whilst it is radical in 
changing how engineers approach the problem, the solutions themselves 
are not controversial and do not utilise cutting edge untested research 
knowledge, for example, the use of advanced modelling of façades is not 
advocated. The course is nonetheless extremely challenging and is 
fitting to the difficulty of designing highly complex buildings. Atten-
dance to the course does not guarantee passing, and once complete the 
engineer should only work within their knowledge and skill level. 
4.2.2. Other relevant building stakeholders 
A second, less in-depth CPD course was developed to upskill other 
relevant building professionals and stakeholders who may encounter 
flammable cladding. The cladding crisis has impacted the whole con-
struction industry including – among others – certifiers, architects, 
building owners, insurers, builders, contractors, manufacturers, regu-
lators, and other engineers. Firefighters and emergency service workers 
may also be included in this group. 
Those involved in cladding work must understand the limits of their 
capabilities. For example, an architect should not be responsible for a 
complex performance-based fire engineering design which they do not 
understand, and they should not make any unsupervised changes 
without consultation and approval of someone sufficiently competent. 
The upskilling of building stakeholders ensures that the information and 
decisions delivered by fire engineers do not have to be excessively 
diluted or simplified to be understood. They will also hold sufficient 
baseline knowledge to identify key hazards e.g. understanding the 
complexity and risk that flammable cladding adds to a building. 
A two-day full-time CPD course was developed for these building 
stakeholders in partnership with the Queensland Government – 
Department of Housing and Public Works. There are four modules in the 
course, where the final two modules act as a basic introduction to fire 
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safety engineering:  
1. Legislative process and requirements – 4 h (delivered by Queensland 
Government): Interpret the legislative requirements including deci-
phering the available pathways and identify compliance pathways 
and the process to consistent routes of product selection, application 
and approval  
2. Interim risk management, referral requirements and process – 4 h 
(delivered by QFES, the Queensland Fire & Emergency Services): 
Understand the role of input from the emergency services  
3. Fire safety strategies, fire dynamics, and external wall systems – 4 h 
(delivered by The University of Queensland): Understand basic fire 
safety principles and considerations in regards to external fire spread  
4. Material behaviour, the Cladding Materials Library, and application 
of data – 4 h (delivered by The University of Queensland) Interpret 
materials procedures, and protocols relevant to external wall as-
semblies and apply the legislative requirements for external wall 
assemblies, including provisional requirements 
4.3. Application 
4.3.1. Implementation in Queensland 
To demonstrate how the framework can be successfully imple-
mented, the process followed in Queensland is outlined in the bullet 
points below and in Fig. 2. This successful implementation in Queens-
land also demonstrates the robustness of the framework. Each step has a 
significant number of technicalities, caveats and intricacies [75] but the 
information provided here should be sufficient to understand the gen-
eral process. 
The process begins with all buildings undergoing Checklist Part 1 
and at each subsequent step the number of buildings being investigated 
can be narrowed down. Documentation must all be registered with the 
Government to be stored centrally. This includes record of the building, 
the owner, any professionals who complete any part of the checklist, and 
all the required information detailed below. Evidence is required that 
the individual engaged is competent and able to perform the job, and 
this varies between each profession. This is a means to improve the 
quality of documentation on buildings.  
• Part 1 – identify possible flammable cladding: The first objective 
is to identify whether a building has any possibility of external fire 
spread whatsoever. If this possibility exists, then the building must 
then progress to Checklist Part 2 (and 3) for an investigation and 
analysis of the materials and the building fire safety strategy. If there 
is any doubt about whether there is the possibility of external fire 
spread, then the building must also progress to the next stage. Of the 
15 000 buildings in Part 1, approximately one quarter progressed to 
Part 2 [54]. The person required to perform this work is the building 
owner, but they may wish to contract the work to a building pro-
fessional who has more knowledge on materials and on the Checklist 
process. The regulator has the power to investigate buildings at will 
and the answers must be truthful otherwise the owner risks prose-
cution. The owner – or a designated subcontractor – must specify the 
function of the building (e.g. hotel, school, etc.), the number of 
storeys, the total floor area, and the materials present by visual 
inspection. 
• Part 2 – extent and nature of flammable cladding: A more thor-
ough investigation is performed, and buildings containing materials 
of uncertain composition may be confirmed as flammable or not 
flammable. A registered and competent building professional is 
required to perform this Part. The professional must state whether 
there are combustible materials using visual inspection, reviewing 
building documents, checking possible product substitute, and pre-
liminary sample testing can be performed to aid assessment. Mate-
rials with definite (or still uncertain) possibility of vertical fire spread 
will progress to Part 3.  
• Part 3 – quantified fire risk assessment of building: The final 
objective is to provide an initial fire risk assessment for the building 
supported by quantified performance. All the relevant evidence must 
be collected, and the assessment must take into consideration the 
entire fire safety strategy of the building and not only consider the 
cladding in isolation. The framework detailed in this manuscript 
supports the assessment performed in this Part and enables estima-
tion of the response of the building. This work may only be per-
formed by a registered and competent fire safety engineering 
professional. The fire engineer must verify whether an existing per-
formance solution exists, deliver the quantified fire risk assessment 
of the building and provide evidence to support this, specify whether 
remediation work is required, and specify whether interim risk 
mitigation measures are required before remediation is completed. 
Following on from Checklist Part 3, a building will have undergone 
an initial investigation and identified potential remediation. The 
investigation may find that the strategy or building was sound, and that 
it is safe with no further work required. In other cases, it will be 
necessary to improve the safety through risk mitigation efforts. The 
development of long-term solutions may require additional testing, 
research, and analysis to form a more detailed and complete fire risk 
assessment for the building. 
4.3.2. Example usage of data from the Library 
In Section 3 previously, the required components of a framework to 
adequately assess buildings were summarised in a bulleted list labelled 
(i)–(vi). The Cladding Material Library represents parts (i)–(iii), and the 
process outlined below describes how the quantified material data can 
be used to provide evidence for risk assessments of external fire spread 
on buildings. While the framework is open-ended, some suggestions are 
given here for some possible ways that the data can be used at present. 
The performance assessment of any product, whether it is through 
the Cladding Materials Library or any other means, needs to first take 
into consideration the requirements of the fire safety strategy. Different 
approaches towards the fire safe design of tall buildings will impose 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the different parts and parties involved. Adapted and reproduced with permission from the Queensland Government – Department of Housing 
and Public Works. 
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different requirements for the products, with some strategies requiring 
the ‘no vertical fire spread’ conditions while others allowing for 
‘bounded’ fire spread rates. Given the specific building requirements 
then the results from the library can be used in different ways. 
Materials can then be classified according to their relative perfor-
mance from the bench-scale data. This may be based on the ignition 
data, burning behaviour, the flame spread characteristics, or any com-
bination of these. 
The simplest method to achieve this would be through correlating 
the performance to existing large-scale data. For example, by identifying 
materials in the library which have corresponding large-scale data, and 
then using these as benchmarks. A material in question could be iden-
tified as better, the same, or worse (based on the classification above) 
when compared with a benchmarked material. From this, a competent 
engineer can understand whether a material is liable to support flame 
spread and provides a rough quantification of fire spread rates and make 
decisions based on this. 
For this, there needs to be the large-scale data available. Two sources 
of this would be comparison with a database of real fires, or through 
existing large-scale test data. The level of data available from real fires, 
including material identification, tends to be severely limited by avail-
able information and its detail and reliability. Flame spread rates for 
various buildings have been estimated by Torero [1] with substantial 
uncertainty margins. This may serve as an estimate for the flame spread 
rate in a real building for a given material, but clear justification will 
have to be given for why a specific value was selected. 
The main sources of large-scale test data are the UK Government-BRE 
BS8414 tests following the Grenfell Tower fire [48] and the FM Global 
4880 tests [41]. Both test series focus predominantly on ACP and insu-
lation combinations, with one or two examples of HPLs. Other large- 
scale data may be available in journals [62,93] but the limited results 
presented in these publications may not be adequate to make a com-
parison. In each case, the assessment should be based on the perfor-
mance of the materials and the system as interpreted by a competent 
engineer. 
More fundamental approaches that can be used to assess the per-
formance of the materials could be according to heat release as is given 
by McLaggan et al. [91]. Using the linear flame height approximate 
developed by Saito et al. [84], the heat release rate can be directly 
correlated to fire spread rates. A more explicit quantification of vertical 
fire spread has also been shown to be possible when adding the results of 
the upward flame spread experiments [94]. Needless to say, these ex-
trapolations do not include all relevant physical phenomena, and 
therefore they are complex in their interpretation and require very 
conservative application. 
A simple approach is to establish products which would clearly 
violate the goals defined by the fire safety strategy by concluding that 
they will lead to fire spread that monotonically increases with scale 
attaining unacceptable values within the scale of the present tests. 
Given that these relative classifications are still based on bench-scale 
data, they most likely will not provide precise real building behaviour. 
Thus, conservative interpretation will still be needed. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Current solutions using the framework 
The database represents a tool which forms a useful component of an 
engineer’s toolkit. At present, knowledge of the fire behaviour of com-
plex flammable façade systems is extremely poor. The approach pro-
moted in this framework is the use of quantified evidence and the use of 
competent professional judgement. 
This means, based on current knowledge, that the possible solutions 
using the database are still highly conservative and are not simply a 
pathway for implementation of innovative materials or systems. The use 
of the Library is not merely justification to use combustible materials 
where desired. When compared with prescriptive options, the solutions 
will often appear similar and will lead to the use of non-combustible 
materials. The key points here are:  
1. The solutions are backed up by quantified fire performance evidence 
and are not based on seemingly arbitrary limits which may change 
over time and are only relevant for some materials in some 
circumstances.  
2. The framework keeps the door open for being able to safely develop 
façade solutions using novel products which do not currently fit 
within existing classification systems in the future. As knowledge 
progresses, the ability to design safe quantified wall systems will also 
improve. New materials and new systems will be able to be incor-
porated, which would not otherwise be possible. 
5.2. Terminology – material, product, and system 
In this paper, material refers to a single element which does not 
include any encapsulation. For ACPs, this refers to the core, and the 
metal skin is removed (Fig. 3). A product refers to a composite element 
which may contain multiple components, for example, the ACP with 
both the core and the bonded metal skins would be considered a prod-
uct. Finally, a system is a collection of products (or materials) which may 
be combined in a number of ways. These systems would also typically 
include weatherproof membranes, fastenings and fixings, and connec-
tion to a substrate or structure. For clarity, these are not shown in Fig. 3. 
The term ‘external wall assembly’ is also sometimes used to mean system. 
The Library focuses on ‘material’ scale to provide an upperbound solu-
tion to the problem, and additional work is required to investigate 
product and system scales more thoroughly. 
6. Conclusions  
• The Cladding Materials Library framework provides quantified 
flammability data as the underpinning knowledge required by en-
gineers to estimate upperbound values for external fire spread rates 
in buildings with flammable claddings. Testing provides rapid and 
reliable identification of materials, and the data is used to support a 
quantified fire risk assessment of a building. The data includes 
chemical composition, thermal degradation, heat of combustion, 
Fig. 3. Diagram showing the use of terminology in a façade system. The 
insulation is not fully annotated. 
M.S. McLaggan et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Construction and Building Materials 300 (2021) 124301
14
ignitability characteristics, flammability and burning behaviour pa-
rameters and a determination of the flame spread parameter. 
• Compliance testing and compliance-based frameworks are not suit-
able for evaluating product systems. They cannot cope with the 
extremely high levels of complexity in façade systems, are not 
futureproof, and the performance of products cannot be ascertained 
through misapplication of material testing. This is especially prob-
lematic in a modern, ever changing world where new materials and 
systems are constantly developed which do not fit into rigid frame-
works. Performance-based solutions in these cases are a must and the 
only viable pathway for complex buildings.  
• The screening protocol defined in the Cladding Materials Library 
delivers a rapid cost-effective means to assess the flammability of 
building samples through cross-referencing with the flammability 
database. Documentation in existing buildings is not adequate and 
this screening protocol is required to satisfactorily identify materials 
and avoid this issue.  
• Upskilling of the industry is critical in delivering adequate solutions. 
Without this, building professionals cannot understand the fire safety 
considerations of external wall assemblies, and practicing fire engi-
neers often lack the expertise to confidently design for external fire 
spread. The framework can only be applied where the industry is 
sufficiently trained and competent.  
• The Cladding Materials Library is a tool which has great benefits but 
has limitations. It is not a means to automatically fix the cladding 
crisis. It provides the basis to make informed decisions, and acts as 
the foundation for a grounds-up approach to understanding façade 
fire spread. Engineers must still exercise their best judgement and 
use it as a tool to enhance their decision-making.  
• This framework philosophically acts as an exemplar for how fire 
safety engineering can be executed. The quantity and configurations 
of materials are known, as well as their fundamental material 
properties and fire performance over a range of conditions. This is 
conceptually similar to the approach proposed by Emmons [76] and 
can be applied to non-cladding cases. 
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